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Survey reliabilityNetworks permitting anonymous contributions continue to expand and ﬂourish. In some networks, the reli-
ability of a contribution is not of particular importance. In other settings, however, the development of a net-
work is driven by speciﬁc purposes which make the reliability of information exchanged of signiﬁcant
importance. One such situation involves the use of information markets for aggregating individuals' prefer-
ences on new or emerging technologies. At this point, there remains skepticism concerning the reliability
of the preference revelations in such markets and thus the resulting preference aggregations and rankings
of emerging technologies. In this paper, we study the reliability of on-line preference revelation using a series
of controlled laboratory experiments. Our analysis includes individuals' pre- and post-experiment rankings of
technologies, individual trading and accumulation activities during an electronics market experiment, the
ﬁnal experimental market outcomes, and a ranking of the same technologies by a panel of experts from a
Fortune 5 company. In addition, as a ﬁnal step, we allowed each participant to actually select and keep a
unit of one of the technologies at zero price (free). That is, we were able to observe each participant's actual
ﬁnal true preference from the set of technologies.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Networks permitting anonymous contributions continue to expand
and ﬂourish. In some networks, the reliability of a contribution is not of
particular importance. Banter in a social media network may include
tongue-in-cheek kidding or creation of a pseudo persona for participa-
tion in a second-life. In other settings, however, the development of a
network is driven by speciﬁc purposes which make the reliability of
information exchanged of signiﬁcant importance. One such situation
involves the implementation of networks for engaging individuals in
real business applications such as the evaluation of new or emerging
technologies [1], new product concepts [3,4,6], and idea generation
[8]. Information preference markets (see discussion in [1]) have gained
growing recognition as a relatively efﬁcient process for gathering
and aggregating information from a large number of dispersed individ-
uals. However, there remains skepticism concerning the reliability ofand funding provided by the
Endowed MIS Research Lab,
rsden@business.uconn.edu
ng).
-NC-ND license.preference revelations (and thus the usefulness of the preference aggre-
gations and decision rankings) gathered in such on-line markets.
Chen et al. [2] argued that the assumption that traders are
“truth-telling”might not be reasonable when an information market
is relatively small. Van de Walle and Turoff [14] observed in their
experiment that a large number of traders chose to follow market
leaders instead of acting based on their private information. To date,
however, we ﬁnd no direct exploration of the accuracy of preference
revelation, no testing of whether individuals really reveal their true
preferences in preference markets. Further, we ﬁnd no direct analysis
of the consistency of individual preference revelations before, during,
and/or after participation in preference markets. Here we report the
structuring, operationalization, and outcomes of a series of controlled
laboratory experiments addressing these issues. The ability to carefully
structure the settings and observe all individual activities and market
occurrences makes laboratory experimentation an attractive process
to address the questions of interest (see [5,7,9,10]). Speciﬁcally, through
controlled laboratory experiments, we seek to address each of the fol-
lowing research questions:
(1) are individuals' actual revealed preferences consistent with ini-
tial reported preference, portfolio accumulation activities during
the course of the experimental market, and/or post-experiment
reported preference?
(2) are individual true revealed preferencesmore closely alignedwith
peer activities during the experimental market and the resulting
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ences pre- and/or post-experiment? and,
(3) is there any relationship between the number of market partici-
pants who accurately reveal their preference and the consistency
between market outcomes and rankings from a panel of experts?
The third question requires a bit of explanation. Chen et al. [1]
explained in detail that their Fortune 5 partner company was not
dis-satisﬁed with the results from the use of panels of experts. The is-
sues for the company were the costs and the lack of scalability of
panels of experts. Here we are not arguing whether or not panels of
experts provide the best outputs. Rather, our experience suggests
that the outcomes from panels of experts are valued by ﬁrms (Chen
et al.'s [1] partner ﬁrm and others) and representative of an interest-
ing comparison. The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we brieﬂy review related literature in preference markets and experi-
mental economics. Section 3 is devoted to the development and discus-
sion of the research questions analyzed in this note. In Section 4, we
outline the design of our experimental market and detail the experi-
mental techniques used to capture the participants' preference revela-
tions over the course of the experimental process. Section 5 presents
the ﬁndings of our controlled experiments. Section 6 summarizes our
ﬁndings and suggests future research directions.
2. Literature review
We use the term “on-line preference markets” to refer to virtual
markets established to collect participants' preference on virtual stocks
representing items of interest. Alternative historical methods used to
capture such information include surveys, focus groups, critical success
factors, and scoring models. Compared to such alternatives, on-line
preference markets have the following advantages: (1) ﬂexibility,
(2) scalability, and (3) ability to incorporate and capture dynamic in-
teractions among participants [4].
Gruca et al. [6] used such markets to forecast new product success,
ﬁnding results similar to those of surveys but with reduced variability
of results. LaComb et al. [8] utilized preference markets in generating
and evaluating new product ideas. They reported increased idea gener-
ation and an expanded number of participants compared to conven-
tional techniques. In a recent study of on-line preference market, Chen
et al. [1] investigated the use of suchmarkets for evaluating and ranking
emerging technologies. The authors developed and implemented an
on-line market for a major corporation with participants being em-
ployees with technology-related job responsibilities. Based on consisten-
cy between the preference market rankings and rankings from a
company-selected panel of experts, the companydecided to invest signif-
icant new funds in further development and use of on-line preference
markets in the area of evaluating emerging technologies. As noted earlier,
we are not arguing that panels of experts necessarily yield the best out-
comes. Rather, our experience suggests that the outcomes from panels
of experts are valued by ﬁrms (Chen et al.'s [1] partner ﬁrm and others)
and representative of an interesting comparison.
While on-line preference markets have begun to get traction in
the business community, many questions remain. In the arena of pre-
dictionmarkets for predicting near future events,Wolfers and Zitzewitz
[15] point out that earning through better prediction provides incen-
tives for traders to reveal their true information. This is consistent
with the experimental economics literature which emphasizes using
signiﬁcant performance based monetary incentive. In on-line prefer-
ence markets, however, the outcomes are an aggregated ranking of
preferences and performance based payoffs are not easily measurable.
Developing performance-based reward metrics linked directly to ob-
servable outcomes is a thorny issue. In the area of emerging technolo-
gies, for example, the actual outcome of interest (commercial success
or failure) cannot actually be determined in a short period of time.
Any new product or emerging technology may be years away fromﬁnal implementation. The actual technologies or product evaluated is
likely to be subsequently modiﬁed or morphed. Further, only a few, if
any, of the products or technologies will move ahead to implementa-
tion. Thus, we are unable to evaluate those not selected and only able
to evaluate those selected, if at all, sometime in the future.
In preference markets, we actually have two measurement issues
of concern. First, as Chen et al. [1] discussed in the area of emerging
technologies, there is the question of whether the preferences ob-
served and aggregated are sufﬁciently closely aligned with a panel
of experts so that a company might use the scalable and more ﬂexible
preference markets to substitute for expense, non-scalable, and often
inﬂexible panels of experts. Second, there is the important question of
whether participants actually reveal their true preferences. While
Chen et al. [1] focused on the former, in this paperwe focus on the latter.
Before detailing our experimental market design and operation-
alization in Section 4, we devote Section 3 to the presentation and
development of a series of preference rankings in order to address
the research questions discussed earlier.
3. Development of rankings for comparison
As noted, earlier work by Chen et al. [1] detailed the structure of
on-line preference market and presented the results and analysis of
a full scale on-line preference market for emerging technologies.
The market was developed and implemented for a Fortune 5 company.
Commenting on the success of the implemented market, the authors
noted, “Perhaps most importantly, our partner company viewed the
study results as sufﬁcient to warrant expanded investigation and use of
on-line preference market in their early-stage emerging technology
screening.” In thatwork, the authors' focuswas at themarket level and in-
cluded analysis of price convergence under various conditions, overall
trading activity (including overall activity of speciﬁc types of trades),
and consistency of market outcomes with results from a panel of experts
engaged by the partner company. The present analysis is focused at the
individual level. As detailed in the next section, our research process, in-
cluding controlled experimentation, provides a series of rankings from
each participant on a set of four technologies. In addition to these individ-
ual rankings, we also have rankings from the experimental market out-
comes (where “shares of stock” in the four technologies were traded)
and those from a panel of experts that evaluated the four technologies.
The panel of experts was enlisted from a technology evaluation commu-
nitywithin the Fortune 5 company, providing a benchmark similar to that
utilized in [1]. The set of available rankings are summarized below,where
the index label, such as I or II corresponds to a time ordering when the
rankings occurwithin the experimental process (the expert panel ranking
has no time order since it is outside the experimental process—we arbi-
trarily assign this ranking the last value or “VI”):
Individual rankings:
I) the participant's rank ordering of technologies on a pre-
experiment survey (PreES);
II) the participant's bids and transactions during the experiment
(IMT);
IV) the participant's rank ordering of technologies on a post-
experiment survey (PostES); and, in a novel twist for this
analysis,
V) the participant's actual choice of a unit of one of the technologies
(Actual).
Experimental market rankings
III) rankings determined by the market's ﬁnal share prices of the
four technologies (MP)
Expert panel rankings
VI) rankings from a panel of experts enlisted from a technology
evaluation community within the Fortune 5 company (Expert)
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on a proffered set of technologies. We note that the fourth ranking by
individuals is only a single ranking, that is, the actual ﬁrst preference of
each individual participant, i.e., the actual choice of one of the four
technologies that an individual could choose and receive for free.
The various rankings – information gathered before, during, and
following the experiment – along with the information gathered
from the panel of experts enabled a variety of consistency analyses.
Fig. 1 depicts the six alternative information sets gathered. Rankings
I–V are clearly time ordered. Ranking set VI (panel of experts) is not
absolutely required to have the information gathered prior to the ex-
periment, but that was the case in our work.
The next section details our experimental process and how each of
the rankings was operationalized. This is followed by a summary of
experiment results and analysis of the outcomes.
4. The experiment process
4.1. Experiment design
Controlled laboratory experiments were used to gather the data nec-
essary to analyze our research questions. This approach has been thor-
oughly discussed and demonstrated, especially in the context of various
market analyses (see [5,7,9,11–13]). Using the open-source software
platform jMarkets (http://jmarkets.ssel.caltech.edu/), we constructed an
initial experimental preference market design and trading process. A se-
ries of pilot experiments were conducted using a group of volunteer par-
ticipants (Ph.D. students, student workers, and university staff), to check
for any issues with system operation, participant understanding or use of
the system, or other issues that might arise. Following the ﬁrst several
pilot runs, modiﬁcations were made to aid participant understanding
(mainly through enhancements in depth and quality of explanatory ma-
terials provided to participants) and in screen design (mainly minor
changes in location and detail of information presented on a participant's
screen). Subsequent trial runs using a mix of earlier participants along
with newvolunteer participants resulted in a second set ofmodiﬁcations.
A third and ﬁnal run by several pilot study participants was completed to
make sure issues had been addressed.
Once the electronic market was constructed and pilot tested, we
moved to the speciﬁcs of our experimental design. Based on past exper-
iments, reports, and recommendations from experimental economics,IV. individual ra
from post—exp
survey (Post
V. individual’s actual 
choice of a unit of one 
of the four technologies 
(Actual)
VI. rankings from panel  
of experts (Expert)
AVAILAB
TECHNOL
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Fig. 1. Six rankings gathered — set for which cotogether with our research budget constraint, we decided on experi-
ments with eight participants in each experiment. Anyone who had
participated in pilot testingwas excluded fromparticipating in an actual
experiment session.
Given typical show-up payments ($10 per subject), overall
reward-based session payments (averaging $10 per subject per ses-
sion as explained below) to participants, and the cost of purchasing
the technology products (slightly less than $20 per subject), our bud-
get enabled eight sessions with eight participants in each session. The
experiment and experimental process were reviewed and approved
by the university's internal human subject review panel. We recruited
64 university students (24 graduate students and 40 undergraduate
students). Of the 24 graduate students, 18 were from the School of
Business, 1 from the Department of Computer Science and Engineer-
ing, and 5 from the Department of Economics. All the undergraduate
students were from the School of Business. Each recruited participant
was randomly assigned into one of the planned eight sessions. We
veriﬁed that recruited subjects had no knowledge of or experience
in preference markets. Instructions to participants were speciﬁc that
they must agree to no communication with any other subject before
or after their session.
The preference market for each session involved four virtual
stocks, each virtual stock representing a product that incorporated
an emerging technology. We choose ﬁnal product formats (with em-
bedded emerging technology) because, in discussion with a variety of
technologists and emerging technology specialists, the strong feeling
was that the ﬁnal product format made it easier for subjects to evalu-
ate them. The products were chosen so that the incorporated emerg-
ing technologies were not competing technologies and the products
were neither substitutes nor complements. The products we chose
had only recently appeared and had not been widely seen in the mar-
ketplace. This choice was made to make it unlikely that participants
would have existing experience with the selected products. In addi-
tion, we chose items of similar monetary value (approximately $20)
to limit any effect on traders' evaluation linked to or inﬂuenced by
the price/value of the item.
4.2. Experiment procedure
Experiments were conducted in a controlled laboratory setting
(the Gladstein Endowed MIS Research Lab). For each session, eachII. individual trading  
activities during 
experiment (IMT)
nkings 
eriment
ES)
III. rankings from final 
market prices (MP)
LE 
OGY
GS
I. individual rankings 
from pre-experiment 
survey (PreES)
nsistencies/inconsistencies are evaluated.
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seated in front of a computer with no view of another participant's
screen. We enforced a strict no-talking policy during the entire session.
One author stayed in the lab during the course of each experiment.
Once the eight participants for a session had been logged in, a
short video (roughly ﬁveminutes)was presented to explain the trading
mechanism they would utilize in the electronic preference market. The
video was created as a means to ensure that participants in different
sessions received consistent instructions and explanations. A hard
copy of the same instruction was also provided to each participant. To
further ensure the instructions were understood, after looking at the
video and reading the detailed instruction participants were then
given a short paper quiz consisting of ﬁve questions. When participants
completed the short quiz, correct answers were reviewed with the par-
ticipants and any questions or requests for clariﬁcation were answered.
Details on the four emerging technology products were provided as
web pages (one for each product) alongwith a hardcopy of product de-
scriptions and details. We note that the instructions and explanations
emphasized that the four products had been evaluated and rated by a
group of emerging technology professionals at a major corporation.
Participants were informed that they would earn performance rewards
based on how their ﬁnal stock portfolio matched up against the ratings
of the set of emerging technology professionals (see details below).
At this point of the session, we collected our ﬁrst set of ranking in-
formation - each participant's pre-experiment preference rankings
(PreES) of the four products. Subjects were asked to ﬁll in a survey
providing their preference orderings on the four products. Typically,
the process involving watching the video, reading instructions, checking
understanding, and completing the survey took approximately 15 min.
Following completion of the pre-experiment survey, a brief
(approximately 5 min) trial session was provided so participants could
experience the preference market interfaces and trading mechanisms.
The trial session incorporated random “phantom offers” so more trades
would go through and help provide participants with an understanding
of the processes.
Following the trial session, the formal forty-minute experiment
began. The trading mechanism followed a double auction framework
that has been widely used in on-line preference markets [1,3,4]. Partic-
ipants begin with an initial stock portfolio and a cash balance. At any
point during the experiment, a participant with sufﬁcient cash balance
can submit a buy order. Similarly, with sufﬁcient stock assets, a partici-
pant can submit a sell order. When another participant (with sufﬁcient
appropriate “assets” or “holdings”) accepts an existing buy or sell order,
a transaction occurs. Transactions of partial volume are permitted.4.3. Incentive details
As noted above, there were two types of rewards in the experiment:
a $10 payment for showing up and a dollar reward based on a
participant's ﬁnal portfolio value where the value is directly linked to
the rating evaluations by a panel of emerging technology experts. ToTable 1
Consistency rates between the ﬁrst choices from ﬁve available rankings and the actual ﬁna
I. pre-market
survey PreES
II. market
transaction IMT
I
o
I. pre-market survey PreES 100% 57.81% 4
II. market transactions IMT 100% 6
III. market outcomes MP 1
IV. post-market survey PostES
V. actual choice Actual
VI. expert panel Expertdetermine the later rewards, we took the total reward payment avail-
able for each of the eight sessions ($80 per session) and divided this
amount so that each share of stock in a given emerging technology
product received a valuation based on the proportionate ranking by
the professionals. Thus, in total, each participant received $10 for show-
ing up and participating, a “ﬁnal portfolio reward” equal to the sum of
shares held of each stock times the weighted value for that stock
(based on the expert panel ratings), and the ﬁnal choice of one technol-
ogy product to keep. Subjects were not aware of the last reward until
after the completion of their market session.
To encourage trading among traders, we utilized the rule that the any
“cash”heldwas valued at zero in theﬁnal portfolio evaluation. The goal of
rewarding participantswith a reasonable show-up fee plus extra rewards
related to their performance relative to expert ratings should help to in-
duce serious market behavior (see the discussion in [7,11,12]). In the
structure utilized, payments to participants ranged from $15 to $24
dollars. Following completion of an experiment, each participant was
again providedwith a survey formused to rank the four technology prod-
ucts (PostES). Following completion of the form and without any prior
indication, each participant was allowed to select and keep one of the
four technology products (Actual). Assuming rationality, this last selec-
tion step provides actual preference revelation of each individual's most
preferred or top choice from the four technology products.
In the next section, we analyze the “preference revelations” obtained
from each of the participants, from the market, and from the expert
panel.
5. Experiment results and analysis
We compiled the six ranking sets indicated in Fig. 1: pre-experiment
survey (PreES) for each individual, market transactions (IMT) for each
individual, post-experiment survey (PostES) for each individual, actual
technology product selection (Actual) for each individual, ﬁnal market
prices (MP) for each of the eight markets, and the expert panel ranking
(Expert) for the four technology products. We consider each of our
three research questions in turn. Table 1 presents the consistency rates
between the ﬁrst choice indicated at various stages and the actual choice
or actual preference.
(1) Do individuals show consistency in initial reported preference,
portfolio accumulation (trading) activities during the course of
the experimental market, post-experiment reported preference,
and ﬁnal actual demonstrated preference?
The post-experiment survey has only a slightly higher consis-
tency rate (73.44%) with the actual choice than does the
pre-experiment (70.31%). That is, 70.3% of the participants re-
vealed their true preference in the pre-survey rising to 73.4%
in the post-survey which was taken after the individuals had
been informed of themarket outcomes. Both however, displayed
greater consistency rates with actual choices than did trading
activities (portfolio accumulations) whose consistency with the
actual choice was 64.06%.l individual choice (the actual individual revealed preference).
II. market
utcomes MP
IV. post-market
survey PostES
V. actual
choice Actual
VI. expert
panel Expert
5.31% 59.38% 70.31% 48.44%
0.94% 68.75% 64.06% 50.00%
00% 59.38% 53.13% 62.50%
100% 73.44% 54.69%
100% 54.69%
100%
274 L. Chen et al. / Decision Support Systems 56 (2013) 270–274(2) Are individual true preferences impacted by peer activities during
the experimental market and the resulting ﬁnal market outcomes?
The market outcome consistency rate with the post-market
survey was 59.38%, an increase of 14.07% from the consistency
rate of 45.31% between the pre-market survey and the market
outcomes. This suggests some impact from peer activities during
the experimental market. The market outcomes had a much
lower consistency rate with actual choice (53.13%) than did the
post-experiment survey with the actual choice (73.44%), but the
market outcomes did have the highest consistency rate (62.5%)
with the expert panel. Finally, the post-market survey and actual
choices each had somewhat higher consistency rates (54.69%)
with the expert panel than did the pre-market survey with the
expert panel (48.44%).
(3) Is there any relationship between the number of market participants
who accurately reveal their preference and the consistency between
market outcomes and rankings from a panel of experts?
For the ﬁve groups whose market choice (MP) was consistent
with the expert panel's top choice (Expert), 23 of 40 individuals
or 57.5% had their Actual being the same as Expert. For the three
groups whose market choice (MP) was inconsistent with the ex-
pert panel's top choice (Expert), 12 of 24 individuals or 50% had
their Actual being the same as Expert. If a ﬁrm (such as the part-
ner ﬁrm in [1]) has utilized panels of experts over time and their
analysis indicates very positive outcomes, then consistency of the
outcomes with those of the panel of experts is certainly a positive
for the that ﬁrm. In general, the valuation of the performance of
panels of experts is done only within a ﬁrm andwe have no gen-
eral or cross-ﬁrm detailed analysis available to us. Thus result
(3) is likely of most interest to ﬁrms having had good results
from the use of panels of experts.6. Summary and Conclusions
We summarize our experimental results as following:
i) We found that just 70.3% of the participants revealed their true
preference in the PreES and 73.4% did so in the PostES, a time
point after the individuals had been informed by the market
outcomes. Thus, even at a point immediately before individuals
revealed their true preference by selecting one technology to
keep (Actual), almost 27% misstated their true preference.
ii) There was some market impact on individual stated preferences
in the sense that consistency rates were higher between PostES
and MP (59.38%) than between PreES and MP (45.31%).
iii) The market outcomes did have the highest consistency rate
(62.5%) with the expert panel.
Further, only one of the markets failed to have the Expert top pick
in the top two MP values.
Of the results detailed in this research note, it is the ﬁrst one that
raises a general concern since it indicates that individuals alone can-
not be counted on to accurately reveal their preferences. In structur-
ing our analysis, we incorporated an opportunity for individuals to
reveal their true preference by selecting and keeping as their own
one of the four technologies. In the PreES, the failure rate for individ-
uals to accurately match their Actual choice was just slightly below
30%. Even after participating in the electronic market and getting
more time to think about the alternatives and observe information
on the ratings (MP) from others, almost 27% still misstated the Actual
preference in the PostES. The latter is evenmore strikingwhenwe recall
that only aminute or so passed between completion of the PostES's and
the Actual choice. These results suggest cause for concern when stated
preferences rather than actual observed choice are used in analyses
and decision making.References
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